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EXPLORING THE LIMITS OF Brady v. Maryland: CRIMINAL
DISCOVERY AS A DUE PROCESS RIGHT IN ACCESS TO POLICE
INVESTIGATIONS AND STATE CRIME LABORATORIES
I. INTRODUCTION
Why not criminal discovery? This question has been posited by legal
scholars and learned jurists alike since the liberalization of discovery
methods under the modern codes of civil procedure.' As inexact as the
term criminal discovery may be and, according to its critics, as inapplica-
ble as discovery may be in the criminal context,2 there is little doubt that
the current trend is the expansion of that which is discoverable by either
side prior to a criminal trial.3 In fact, criminal discovery has developed
into something more than a problem of procedure to be resolved by the
individual jurisdictions in piecemeal fashion. In the framework of the
prosecutor's duty to disclose evidence favorable to the defense, it has
achieved constitutional proportions.4
The United States Supreme Court in the case of Brady v. Maryland5
held that the suppression of evidence which is favorable to an accused by
the prosecution is a violation of due process if the evidence has been re-
quested and if it is material to either guilt or punishment.' Although ear-
lier suppression cases dealt with actual prosecutorial misconduct," the Su-
preme Court made it clear that this duty attaches regardless of the good
faith or bad faith of the prosecutor." Both the dissenting opinion and a
separate opinion by Justice White criticized the Court for invoking due
process and preferred to decide the issue on narrower grounds.9 Still,
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37. Promulgated in 1938 and codified in Title 28 of the United
States Code, the discovery rules seek to minimize surprise at trial and allow for the "full
creative potential of the adversary process." Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Bal-
ance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1180 (1960).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
3. For a discussion of the expansion of criminal discovery in West Virginia, see Note,
Criminal Procedure-Discovery-Movement Toward Full Disclosure, 77 W. VA. L. REV. 561
(1975), which recounts the legislative and judicial actions modifying the common law rule of
prohibiting criminal discovery.
4. Nakell, Criminal Discovery for the Defense and the Prosecution-The Developing
Constitutional Considerations, 50 N.C.L. REv. 437 (1972).
5. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
6. Id. at 87.
7. Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
8. 373 U.S. at 87.
9. Id. at 91-95 (White, J., concurring opinion; Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice White points
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Brady remains the most far-reaching case under the general heading of
criminal discovery for the very reason that due process mandates
disclosure. 10
Ambiguity in the Brady decision led to litigation in the lower courts
which attempted to bring the blurred areas of the holding into focus." A
subsequent Supreme Court case' 2 helped to clarify analysis by recogniz-
ing three subsections to the Brady rule: (1) suppression by the prosecu-
tion after a request by the defense; (2) the favorable character of the evi-
dence; and (3) the materiality of the evidence."8 Finally, in United States
v. Agurs,'4 the Court defined materiality and, as a practical consequence,
confined Brady to those instances in which specific requests for favorable
evidence are made by the defense. Apart from these specific request situ-
ations, the Court went on to hold that the prosecution also has a duty to
disclose in situations of perjured testimony' 5 and in situations when a
general request is made or even when no request for favorable evidence is
made, so long as the evidence itself is material.' Materiality was framed
in terms of the finding of guilt: a finding of guilt is permissible only if
supported by evidence establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and
if the omission of certain evidence creates reasonable doubt that did not
otherwise exist, then the evidence was material and constitutional error
has occurred."
Agurs may have cleared the air somewhat but was unfaithful to the
spirit of Brady and the public policy arguments upon which it was
based.' At the same time, Brady enjoys a kind of vitality within its pre-
out that while couching the rule in terms of due process, the majority opinion by Justice
Douglas cites neither the United States nor the Maryland Constitutions. He goes on to say:
In any event the Court's due process advice goes substantially beyond the holding
below. I would employ more confining language and would not cast in constitutional
form a broad rule of criminal discovery. Instead, I would leave this task, at least for
now, to the rulemaking or legislative process after full consideration by legislators,
bench, and bar.
Id. at 92.
10. See generally Annot., 34 A.L.R.3d 16 (1970).
11. United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1968); Jackson v. Wainwright, 390 F.2d
288 (5th Cir. 1968); Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Barbee v. Warden,
331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964).
12. Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972). See note 59 infra for a discussion of this case.
13. Id. at 794-95.
14. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
15. Id. at 103.
16. Id. at 107.
17. Id. at 112.
18. See notes 21 to 34 infra and accompanying text.
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scribed limits. Despite the limitations placed on Brady by Agurs, several
recent cases19 have extended the parameters of Brady to the point that it
may be said that the prosecutor's duty to disclose favorable evidence be-
gins with the investigation of the crime itself.20 The due process require-
ments of Brady would then involve defense participation in the police
investigation and access to state crime laboratory facilities. Such access
would be particularly meaningful to indigents within the criminal justice
system. It can be argued that denial of access to such facilities is the kind
of suppression condemned by Brady and its lineage in that the evidence
which may be favorable to the accused is never developed.
II. POLICY BEHIND Brady
Before examining the limits of Brady, it is necessary to identify the
policy arguments behind the decision and to trace the evolution of the
rule in the case law before and after Brady and Agurs. Although by no
means concluded today, the criminal discovery controversy reached its
zenith in the late 1950's and early 1960's as initial breakthroughs in the
area were being made.2 1 The segment of the legal community advocating
reform expounded its attack in the law reviews and scholarly journals;22
those against criminal discovery included many active judges who sup-
ported the status quo in their case opinions.2 3
Three reasons are generally offered as the traditional arguments against
criminal discovery. First, under our system of criminal procedure, the ac-
cused already has every advantage, as, for example, the privilege against
self-incrimination 2 4 Second, criminal discovery would inevitably lead to
19. Peoples v. Hocker, 423 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1970); Adams v. Stone, 378 F. Supp. 315
(N.D. Cal. 1974); Bowen v. Eyman, 324 F. Supp. 339 (D. Ariz. 1970).
20. See generally Note, Toward a Constitutional Right to an Adequate Police Investiga-
tion: A Step Beyond Brady, 53 N.Y.U.L. REv. 835 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, Toward
a Constitutional Right].
21. Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 228 (1964)
(tracing the development of criminal discovery in California).
22. Garber, The Growth of Criminal Discovery, 1 CitM. L.Q. 3 (1962); Goldstein, The
State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149
(1960); Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 56
(1961); Orfield, Discovery and Inspection in Federal Criminal Procedure, 59 W. VA. L. REV.
221 (1957).
23. United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1923); State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98
A.2d 881 (1953); Commonwealth v. Wable, 382 Pa. 80, 114 A.2d 334 (1955); Flannery, The
Prosecutor's Case Against Liberal Discovery, 33 F.R.D. 74 (1963) (part of a symposium on
discovery in federal criminal cases).
24. United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1923), Judge Learned Hand stated:
. Under our criminal procedure the accused has every advantage. While the prosecu-
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the manufacture of false testimony by the defense at trial and almost
certain perjury by the accused if on the witness stand.25 Finally, the ac-
cused upon learning the identity of the prosecution's witnesses might be
inclined to bribe or intimidate them.2 The result would be a system
tainted by fraud and deceit in which all the advantages accrue to the
defendant. The argument concludes that criminal discovery is a one-way
street easily manipulated by the criminal element and eventually produc-
ing the destruction of the adversary process.2 7
The pro-discovery advocates argue that, in practice, the opposite is true
since the state has most of the advantages. Their rebuttal focuses on the
need for fairness and equality between the parties at trial.28 Justice Bren-
nan, a leading proponent of liberalized criminal discovery, wrote:
I submit that we must rethink our opposition to allowing the accused crimi-
nal discovery, certainly if we are to continue to maintain that our system of
criminal justice, if not favoring the accused, at least keeps the scales evenly
balanced in his contest with the state. Are the scales really evenly balanced?
Who are our criminal defendants? . . . Judges know that the largest per-
centage of these people are indigent.2"
He further condemned the critics of discovery who implied by their rea-
soning that the accused was guilty and, as a result, had no right to com-
plain that his counsel was being denied access to the materials which
might better aid him in developing the whole truth.3 0 The pro-discovery
element believes the taint in the system comes from the side of the prose-
tion is held rigidly to the charge, he need not disclose the barest outline of his de-
fense. He is immune from question or comment on his silence; he cannot be convicted
when there is the least fair doubt in the minds of any one of the twelve .... Our
dangers do not lie in too little tenderness to the accused. Our procedure has always
been haunted by the ghost of the innocent man convicted .... What we need to fear
is the archaic formalism and the watery sentiment that obstructs, delays, and defeats
the prosecution of crime.
Id. at 649.
25. State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881, 884 (1953).
26. Id. But see Louisell, supra note 22, at 100, where the argument is made that such
intimidation is only involved in cases of organized crime or professional criminals.
27. Recently, a fourth reason for nondiscovery has been suggested: the intrusion on the
prosecution's work product. For a discussion of this and an excellent overall treatment of
the traditional arguments, see Rice, Criminal Defense Discovery: A Prelude to Justice or an
Interlude to Abuse, 45 Miss. L.J. 887 (1974).
28. Goldstein, supra note 22, at 1192: "If a procedural system is to be fair and just, it
must give each of the participants to a dispute the opportunity to sustain his position."
29. Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Question for Truth, 1963
WASH. L.Q. 279, 285.
30. Id. at 287.
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cutor who, because of his inequal power in marshalling the resources of
the state to assist him, gains the advantage and makes a fair trial impos-
sible.31 The harm to the defendant takes on constitutional proportions
since it denies him the fairness of trial required by the fifth amendment.32
The Brady decision adopted three public policy arguments as the rea-
soning to support the opinion: (1) equalizing the sides should more read-
ily create a fair trial that will arrive at the truth; (2) such fairness is an
important element of the trial and (3) the ultimate conviction of the ac-
cused is not the paramount consideration.3 In historical retrospect,
Brady can best be viewed as part of the expansion of rights granted to
the criminally accused by the Supreme Court in the 1960's and is wholly
consistent with other decisions aimed at nurturing trials that are funda-
mentally fair.3 '
I. THE Brady LINEAGE
As stated earlier, the genesis of the Brady rule pertained to cases deal-
ing with the conduct of the prosecution, specifically the knowing use of
perjured testimony.3 5 In Mooney v. Holohan,ss manufactured evidence re-
sulted in the petitioner's conviction below, prompting the Supreme Court
31. See Note, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Reveal Evidence to the Defen-
dant, 74 YALE L.J. 136, 143 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Prosecutor's Constitu-
tional Duty]. But cf. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 n.20 (1976) (criticizing the
above line of reasoning).
32. "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law. .. ." U.S. CONsT. amend. V. Traynor, supra note 21, at 229, reasons: "The states are
free to adopt their own rules of criminal procedure so long as those rules comply with the
minimum requirements of fairness imposed upon the states by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution."
33. "Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair;
our system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly."
373 U.S. at 87. Accord, Application of Kapatos, 208 F. Supp. 883 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (The
purpose of a trial is as much the acquittal of an innocent person as it is the conviction of a
guilty one).
34. E.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See
Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting). "Whatever disagreement
there may be as to the scope of the phrase 'due process of law,' there can be no doubt that it
embraces the fundamental conception of a fair trial ...... Id. at 347. The phrase fundamen-
tal fairness was used extensively in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971), and has
been grafted into other areas including the Brady suppression opinions.
35. See generally Comment, Materiality and Defense Requests: Aids in Defining the
Prosecutor's Duty of Disclosure, 59 IOWA L. REv. 433 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Comment,
Materiality and Defense Requests].
36. 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (per curiam) (petitioner's habeas corpus relief denied without
prejudice since no exhaustion of state remedies).
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to state:
[due process] is a requirement that cannot be deemed to be satisfied by
mere notice and hearing if a State has contrived a conviction through the
pretense of a trial which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a
defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the
presentation of testimony known to be perjured.37
This line of reasoning was enlarged seven years later in Pyle v. Kansas3 8
where, allegedly, the use of perjured testimony had been coupled with the
deliberate suppression of evidence favorable to the accused. Two subse-
quent Supreme Court decisions held, respectively, that the prosecution,
although not soliciting the falsehood, must correct such evidence when it
does appear and is relevant to punishment 9 and, likewise, must correct
false evidence even if it involves only the credibility of the witness.40 In
summary, the early cases ruled that a prosecutor cannot suborn perjury
or allow perjured testimony to go uncorrected even as to credibility of the
witness.
The stage was set for Brady when the federal courts began to de-em-
phasize the prosecutor's role and motives and to stress the unfairness to
the defendant in suppressing favorable evidence. In one case,' 1 the prose-
37. Id. at 112. The Court refused to take a narrow view of due process just because the
correct procedure had been followed.
38. 317 U.S. 213 (1942) (reversing denial of a writ of habeas corpus). The Court felt a
determination should be made as to the verity of petitioner's allegations that the prosecu-
tion coerced witnesses to perjure themselves to gain a murder conviction and concluded:
Petitioner's papers are inexpertly drawn, but they do set forth allegations that his
imprisonment resulted from perjured testimony, knowingly used by the State author-
ities to obtain his conviction, and from the deliberate suppression by those same au-
thorities of evidence favorable to him. These allegations sufficiently charge a depriva-
tion of rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution....
Id. at 215-16.
39. Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957) (per curiam) (witness' testimony, known to prose-
cution, would have corroborated heat-of-passion defense and reduced murder conviction).
40. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959). The witness had taken part in a robbery with
petitioner and lied that he had received no consideration from the government for testifying
against his former cohort. The Court held:
The principle that a State may not knowingly use false evidence, including false testi-
mony, to obtain a tainted conviction, implicit in any concept of ordered liberty, does
not cease to apply merely because false testimony goes only to the credibility of the
witness. The jury's estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may
well be determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as the
possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a defendant's life or liberty
may depend.
Id. at 269. See also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
41. United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Ragen, 86 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. I1. 1949). "Due
194
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cutor suppressed a hospital report which indicated the victim had not
been raped. This led the court to reason that the prosecutor, "to be fair,
[must] not only use the evidence against the criminal, but must not will-
ingly ignore that which is in an accused's favor. '42 In a second case,4 3 a
ballistics report and an examination of the fatal bullet were suppressed. If
introduced, these might have reduced the death penalty imposed on the
defendant. Finally, in a third case,4 4 an arresting officer who thought the
defendant was intoxicated at the time of arrest was not called by the
prosecution. The court criticized the prosecution and refused to put the
onus on the defense by hypothesizing that even the most outstanding de-
fense lawyer could not have been held to placing the second arresting
officer on the stand.45 It is important that two of the above cases empha-
sized the importance of the jury's evaluation of the suppressed evidence
in the context of all the circumstances rather than reliance on some pre-
trial determination by the government.4" In United States ex rel. Thomp-
son v. Dye,47 when the prosecutor's motive not to call the officer was neu-
tral in basis, the court focused on the ultimate disadvantage to the
accused at trial instead of the existence of an injurious intent to suppress.
The language employed in these decisions was that of due process and
fairness and would color the sparse holding in Brady by embodying the
policy reasons put forward in the criminal discovery debate. 48
process, in short, means fair play." Id. at 388, relying on Jones v. Kentucky, 97 F.2d 335
(6th Cir. 1938). The court felt that it made no difference that the perjury was unknown until
after trial.
42. 86 F. Supp. at 387.
43. United States ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi, 195 F.2d 815 (3d Cir. 1952). Petitioner was
convicted under a felony-murder statute but the fatal bullet was fired from a police officer's
service revolver during a shoot-out following the robbery. A writ of habeas corpus was
granted because of the denial of due process.
44. United States ex. rel. Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.2d 763 (3d Cir. 1955) (habeas corpus
relief was available since suppressed testimony negated prosecution theory of premeditated
murder).
45. Id. at 768.
46. "Clearly the relevancy and weight of the heretofore undisclosed evidence of the ar-
resting officers ... was for the jury." Id. at 767. "The jury might not have been impressed
by the supressed evidence and could still have imposed the death penalty on Almeida but it
cannot be assumed that the jury would have done so." 195 F.2d at 820. Cf. Napue v. Illinois,
360 U.S. 264 (1959) (Chief Justice Warren's majority opinion commented on the interplay of
the evidence and the jury). See also United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 117 (1976) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).
47. 221 F.2d 763 (3d Cir. 1955).
48. It is interesting to note that Brady cited Baldi and Dye as correctly stating the consti-
tutional rule of due process. 373 U.S. at 86. See also 221 F.2d at 769 (Hastie, J., concurring):
[T]his is an area in which the question of fundamental fairness depends so much
upon the facts of the particular case that a precise rule can not be devised .... [I]t is
1980]
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In Brady itself, the defendant was found guilty of first degree murder,
the killing having occurred during an armed robbery.49 To avoid the
death sentence, Brady testified that his accomplice had committed the
actual killing. The accomplice had not yet been tried so Brady's attorney
sought from the government any statements by the accomplice. The at-
torney received several such statements but did not receive one in which
the accomplice admitted the killing. The Supreme Court held that this
amounted to a denial of due process regardless of prosecutorial motive
where it appeared that the failure to send the statement was due to negli-
gence and not purpose.50
The federal courts began to grapple with the interpretation of the
Brady rule as the definition of materiality and the conduct of the de-
fense 51 became major points of contention. United States ex rel. Meers v.
Wilkins52 concerned the suppression of the affidavits of two eyewitnesses
to a robbery wherein the witnesses did not identify the petitioner as the
perpetrator of the crime. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals believed
that the failure of the defense counsel to request the evidence did not
preclude disclosure on the part of the government. The test was one of
fundamental fairness given all the circumstances of the case. Levin v.
Katzenbachs4 dealt with the prosecution's negligent suppression of testi-
mony which would have contradicted other government witnesses in a
conspiracy trial. Concluding that a criminal trial was not a "game of
wits" s predicated upon the cleverness or available resources of opposing
counsel, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals remanded for
a hearing on the suppressed evidence because the diligence of defense
not every case in which the prosecution must reveal the availability of testimony in-
consistent with the government's contentions. But in special circumstances such non-
disclosure may, and here it certainly does, amount to fundamental unfairness in the
trial of a criminal case.
49. 373 U.S. at 84.
50. Id. at 87. The Court further held that under Maryland law Brady was entitled to a
new trial only as to the question of punishment. Id. at 90.
51. "Conduct of the defense" may be interpreted as including the diligence of the defense
counsel in seeking favorable evidence, the motion for requesting favorable evidence in the
possession of the prosecution, and the timing of the motion. For a discussion of timing of
the motion, see generally Comment, Brady v. Maryland and the Prosecutor's Duty to Dis-
close, 40 U. Cui. L. REv. 112, 117-120 (1972).
52. 326 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1964).
53. Id. at 138. See also Ashley v. Texas, 319 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1963) (failure of District
Attorney to inform defense of psychiatric tests proving incompetency of accused amounted
to fundamental unfairness and denial of due process).
54. 363 F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
55. Id. at 291.
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counsel was not determinative.5 6 A case summarizing both the request
and materiality aspects of Brady was United States v. Hibler,57 in which
the prosecutor failed to disclose an officer's testimony that corroborated
the defendant's explanation as to his after-the-fact involvement with a
car used earlier that day in a mail robbery. Announcing a "duty of can-
dor," the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held:
The test is whether the undisclosed evidence was so important that its ab-
sence prevented the accused from receiving his constitutionally-guaranteed
fair trial. That defense counsel did not specifically request the information,
that a "diligent" defense attorney might have discovered the information on
his own with sufficient research, or that the prosecution did not suppress
the evidence in bad faith, are not conclusive; due process cannot be denied
by failure to disclose alone ....
Thus Hibler is entitled to reversal if the government failed to disclose
evidence which, in the context of this particular case, might have led the
jury to entertain a reasonable doubt about his guilt. 8
The Supreme Court itself began to back away from Brady in a series of
decisions 59 culminating in United States v. Agurs. 0 In holding that the
Brady rule would be applicable in three situations, the Agurs decision
seemed to rely heavily on the analysis by Judge Friendly in United
States v. Keogh.6 1 The first situation involves undisclosed evidence of
which the prosecutor has actual or constructive knowledge and which in-
56. Id. at 289. See also Jackson v. Wainwright, 390 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1968) (defense
lawyer cannot be expected to know testimony of witness subpoenaed but not called by the
state).
57. 463 F.2d 455 (9th Cir. 1972).
58. Id. at 459-60 (citations omitted). But see United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138 (2d
Cir. 1968) (defense request acts as an important indication of what is material and puts the
prosecution on notice thereof).
59. The highwater mark of Brady was Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967), wherein the
Supreme Court remanded for retrial based upon suppressed evidence that tended to im-
peach the credibility of the prosecutrix in a rape case. The plurality declined to define mate-
riality or extend the duty to disclose to all evidence admissible and useful to the defense; a
concurring opinion by Justice Fortas would have extended the duty to inadmissible evi-
dence. But in Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972), the Court held that suppressed evi-
dence, which included an incorrect diagram of the scene of the robbery by one witness and a
mistaken identification of defendant by another, was not material nor sufficient to overcome
the conviction given the weight of the rest of the evidence. Although not defining material-
ity, the Court foreshadowed Agurs by stating there is no constitutional requirement that the
prosecution disclose all investigatory work.
60. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
61. 391 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1968).
1980]
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dicates the use of perjury in the government's case.6" Fundamental un-
fairness is manifest and the conviction must be set aside if there is any
reasonable likelihood that the perjury would have affected the judgment
of the jury. The second situation, illustrated by Brady itself, is character-
ized by a pretrial request for specific evidence;" such evidence is material
if it might have affected the outcome of the trial. The third situation
arises when no request for material is made or when only a general re-
quest for all "Brady material" is proffered." This category is best illus-
trated by the facts in Agurs. In Agurs, the petitioner was convicted of
second degree murder after a late-night interlude ended in the stabbing
death of her male companion. Petitioner argued self-defense and her
counsel made no request for evidence in possession of the government.
After the conviction, facts surrounding the dead man's prior criminal re-
cord and violent proclivities came to light. The Court held that material-
ity in such a situation was defined in terms of "the justice of the finding
of guilt."65 Such a definition is consistent with, as one commentator has
stated, the Burger Court's concern with factual guilt as opposed to legal
guilt.6 6
The Agurs standard of fairness seems to be predicated upon an out-
come determinative test6 7 rather than on the ability to prepare for trial.66
The question becomes: would the suppressed evidence have created a rea-
sonable doubt as to the finding of guilt? In effect, the appeals judge mak-
ing this determination sits in de novo review of the facts of the case. The
dissent by Justice Marshall criticized this method as an invasion of the
province of the jury. 9 While not citing Chapman v. California,0 the
62. 427 U.S. at 103.
63. Id. at 104.
64. Id. at 107. The Court equated a general request with no request at all.
65. Id. at 112.
66. See Note, Toward a Constitutional Right, supra note 20, at 850-52. Broadly speaking,
factual guilt is concerned with whether or not the defendant actually committed the acts
constituting the crime while legal guilt examines procedural regularity and official propriety
as well as the probability of factual guilt. Cf. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) which
stated that relevant inquiry in a federal court habeas corpus proceeding is whether any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasona-
ble doubt. Employing this standard, the Court affirmed petitioner's conviction since there
was no question that the petitioner had fatally shot the victim and a trier of fact could have
found the specific intent necessary for a murder conviction.
67. 14 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 319, 330 n.76 (1976).
68. Agurs offers its rebuttal to the ability to prepare for trial policy: "[Tihat standard
would necessarily encompass incriminating evidence as well as exculpatory evidence, since
knowledge of the prosecutor's case would always be useful in planning the defense." 427
U.S. at 112 n.20.
69. Id. at 117 (Marshall, J., dissenting). But cf. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)
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Agurs decision seems to adopt the same harmless error perspective ex-
plained in Chapman in that, if the prosecutor's suppressed evidence
would not have made any difference, then it is not material and constitu-
tional error has not occurred."1
It is the contention of commentators critical of Agurs that the Brady
policy of pretrial harm was incorrectly overlooked.7 2 The fact that much
evidence is neutral on its face"3 and must be developed in a trial setting 4
was glossed over by Agurs. In addition, the role of the jury in evaluating
the suppressed evidence in conjunction with other facts of the case was
downplayed.7 5 The practical effect of Agurs is that general defense re-
(Stevens, J., concurring):
According to the Court, the Constitution now prohibits the criminal conviction of any
person-including, apparently, a person against whom the facts have already been
found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury, a trial judge, and one or more levels of
state appellate judges-except upon proof sufficient to convince a federal judge that
a "rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt."
Id. at 326-27. It is hard to square Justice Stevens' opinion for the court in Agurs with his
Jackson concurrence: the former seeks to expand the reviewing powers of the court while
the latter would limit it. Perhaps, the best explanation is Justice Stevens' concern with the
federal court caseload. Such caseload would potentially be increased by Jackson but not
Agurs since implementation of Agurs would occur primarily in state courts.
70. 386 U.S. 18 (1966) (error, to be harmless, must not have contributed to conviction).
71. 427 U.S. at 112-13. One district court, however has volunteered a pertinent assess-
ment of the Agurs decision: a balancing between the specificity of the request and the mate-
riality of the evidence. In United States v. Callahan, 442 F. Supp. 1213 (D. Minn. 1978), the
court reasoned:
Implicit in this focus is the idea that the prosecutorial duty to disclose must be bal-
anced against defendant's right to a fair trial. As the information becomes more im-
portant or as the degree of prosecutorial notice of it increases, the duty to disclose
broadens. Conversely, this balance tips most acutely in the favor of the prosecution
when the evidence does not demonstrate perjured testimony and when the prosecutor
is not put on notice of it either by a defense request or actual knowledge.
Id. at 1227. Cf. United States ex rel. Marzano v. Gingler, 574 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1978) requir-
ing a balancing between the evidence presented and the evidence suppressed:
In some instances, relatively minor facts that are withheld from a defendant may be
enough to justify vacating a conviction, if the undisclosed information directly casts
doubt on the evidence presented to the jury ... On the other hand, unrevealed evi-
dence which by itself might seem more exculpatory than that justifying a new trial in
another case may nevertheless not be considered material in a case where other evi-
dence before the jury removes any doubts about the question of guilt.
Id. at 736 (citations and footnotes omitted).
72. See supra note 67, at 330.
73. See Note, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty, supra note 31, at 147.
74. See supra note 67, at 331.
75. See United States v. Hibler, 463 F.2d 455, 460 (9th Cir. 1972); Levin v. Katzenbach,
363 F.2d 287, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1966). The standard for materiality formulated by the Agurs
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quests for "all Brady material" (the third Agurs situation) will be denied
since such denial does not amount to suppression." To avoid the third
situation and a strict test of materiality, the defense must make a specific
request for evidence so as to fit within the second Agurs situation and a
less strict standard of materiality. 1
Since Agurs, courts have attempted to fit cases into one of the three
enumerated situations but have encountered new areas of controversy
aside from the three situations. In United States v. McCrane,7 the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals implied that the government might have a duty
to ask for a clarification or narrowing of any defense request. 9 McCrane
thus created a "saving" doctrine in that general requests could be trans-
formed into specific ones requiring disclosure of evidence in the prosecu-
tion's possession. Determining, under the facts of the case, that the re-
quest made had not been general, the decision stated that the language
employed by the defense in making the request, the government's oppor-
tunity to clarify the request at a hearing, and a warning by the pretrial
judge admonishing the government to deliver favorable evidence "all re-
quire that the request [in this case] be judged by Agurs' specific request
test."80
A second area of controversy concerns distinguishing between sup-
pressed evidence pertinent to the merits of the defense and evidence used
for impeachment purposes.81 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Gar-
rison v. Maggio,8 2 has created a more stringent standard of materiality in
the impeachment cases, "one requiring petitioner to demonstrate that the
dissent was that "[if there is a significant chance that the withheld evidence, developed by
skilled counsel, would have induced a reasonable doubt in the minds of enough jurors to
avoid h conviction, then the judgment of conviction must be set aside." 427 U.S. at 119
(1976). See also United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1968).
76. United States v. DiCarlo, 575 F.2d 952 (1st Cir. 1978); United States v. Lasky, 548
F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Callahan, 442 F. Supp. 1213 (D. Minn. 1978).
77. See Comment, Materiality and Defense Requests, supra note 35, at 451. As a matter
of course, the mind set of the prosecution is to gather evidence that is incriminating. This
results in exculpatory evidence being unintentionally overlooked. Cf. United States v. Ke-
ogh, 391 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1968) (requests from defense counsel flag prosecutor as to what is
material).
78. 547 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1976). An earlier decision, usually referred to as McCrane One,
527 F.2d 906 (3d Cir. 1975), had been vacated by the Supreme Court, 427 U.S. 909 (1976),
and remanded for reconsideration in light of Agurs.
79. 547 F.2d at 208.
80. Id. Contra, United States v. DiCarlo, 575 F.2d 952 (1st Cir. 1978); United States v.
Hearst, 435 F. Supp. 29 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
81. See generally Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 181 (1966). However, language in Agurs, especially
in the third situation, deals with favorable evidence that is only exculpatory.
82. 540 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 940 (1977).
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new evidence probably would have resulted in an acquittal. 's 3 Only when
this standard is met will a new trial be granted by the fifth circuit be-
cause of nondisclosure of impeachment evidence.84
Finally, some dispute has arisen over the suppression of evidence in
plea bargaining before trial. Suppression of evidence in a plea bargaining
situation is more vulnerable to abuse than other situations and leaves the
accused particularly defenseless. The court in Fambo v. Smiths5 held:
In order to maintain the integrity of the plea bargaining process and to as-
sure that a guilty plea entered by a defendant is done so voluntarily, know-
ingly and intelligently, a prosecutor has a duty, during the course of plea
bargaining, to disclose to the defendant evidence that is clearly exculpatory
of certain elements of the crime charged as is the contested evidence in this
case. 8
IV. VIRGINIA AND FOURTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS
During the post-Brady era, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals distin-
guished itself as a liberal interpreter of the Brady rule. In the case of
Barbee v. Warden,87 the petitioner was convicted of shooting a police of-
ficer, but fingerprint and ballistics reports, showing that petitioner's gun
was not used in the assault and his fingerprints were not on the assail-
ant's car, were suppressed. The court dismissed the argument as to the
diligence of defense counsel in uncovering favorable evidence and stated:
In gauging the nondisclosure in terms of due process, the focus must be on
the essential fairness of the procedure and not on the astuteness of either
counsel .... Failure of the police to reveal such material evidence in their
possession is equally harmful to a defendant whether the information is
purposely, or negligently, withheld. And it makes no difference if the with-
holding is by officials other than the prosecutor.88
The Fourth Circuit later fashioned its own test of materiality by treating
83. Id. at 1274.
84. Id. But see Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S.
264 (1959).
85. 433 F. Supp. 590 (W.D.N.Y. 1977).
86. Id. at 598. The flavor of this case is distinctly that of the earlier suppression cases in
focusing on the ethics of the prosecutor. In fact, the Supreme Court has exhibited a long-
standing concern with prosecutorial ethics. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971)
(holding that the prosecutor's plea bargain promise must be kept); Berger v. United States,
295 U.S. 78 (1935) (holding that a prosecutor has a twofold aim-the guilty shall not escape
nor the innocent suffer). But see Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) (due process
was not violated when a prosecutor threatened during plea negotiations to reindict).
87. 331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964).
88. Id. at 846.
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
favorable evidence as material if there was "substantial likelihood that it
would have affected the result if known at the trial.... ."89 Since Agurs,
the Fourth Circuit has decided two suppression cases that were distin-
guishable from Agurs in that they concerned promises of leniency to the
witnesses in exchange for their testimony.90
The leading Virginia Supreme Court case on suppression of evidence is
Stover v. Commonwealth91 which falls squarely within the Brady rule.
Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder arising out of a car
chase and subsequent knife fight. His attorney asked for statements of
witnesses but was told there were none. However, the prosecutor did have
in his files the police report of a prior violent incident involving the vic-
tims but felt it was irrelevant or immaterial. Even though the prosecu-
tor's conduct was not improper, the Virginia Supreme Court reversed and
remanded for a new trial because by "passive or inadvertant nondisclo-
sure Stover was denied the opportunity to show that he was set upon by
persons who had recently committed acts of violence .... '
Three years later, the court in Bellfield v. Commonwealth" refused to
allow the defendant to discover, for impeachment purposes, statements
made by prosecution witnesses after they had testified. The petitioner ar-
gued that the Virginia Supreme Court should adopt a version of the
Jencks rule to allow such discovery." However, since the Stover decision,
89. Ingram v. Peyton, 367 F.2d 933, 936 (4th Cir. 1966). The suppressed evidence in this
case was the victim's prior conviction for perjury. The victim's name had been misspelled,
thereby concealing his past record. This error, though unintentional, led to a reversal of the
conviction given the importance of a fair trial for the accused. See also Hamric v. Bailey,
386 F.2d 390 (4th Cir. 1967) (prosecution suppressed report showing slivers of glass in the
victim's shirt tending to corroborate allegations that he was climbing through a window
when shot).
90. United States v. Sutton, 542 F.2d 1239 (4th Cir. 1976); Boone v. Paderick, 541 F.2d
447 (4th Cir. 1976). The implication of these cases is that the Fourth Circuit rejects the
Fifth Circuit's higher standard of materiality for impeachment evidence. This is confirmed
by the recent decision, Sennett v. Sheriff of Fairfax County, 608 F.2d 537 (4th Cir. 1979),
which held that the prosecutor's refusal to honor a specific defense request for the names of
two witnesses that would discredit a government witness was reversible error. "This is not a
case where impeachment evidence would be merely cumulative or have no significant effect
on the witness' credibility." Id. at 538. See also United States v. Figurski, 545 F.2d 389 (4th
Cir. 1976) (evidence to discredit a government witness falls within the Brady rule).
91. 211 Va. 789, 180 S.E.2d 504 (1971).
92. Id. at 794-96, 180 S.E.2d at 509. But see the earlier case of Abdel v. Commonwealth,
173 Va. 458, 2 S.E.2d 293 (1939) (tending to disallow pretrial criminal discovery).
93. 215 Va. 303, 208 S.E.2d 771 (1974).
94. The Jencks Act, not previously discussed, is found at 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976) and
prohibits pretrial statements of government witnesses. However, at trial and after testifying,
witnesses' statements can be produced upon motion by the defense. The act was passed in
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the General Assembly had enacted a new Rule of Court which provided
for limited pretrial discovery but exempted discovery of just such state-
ments."s Moreover, the court distinguished Stover and Bellfield on the
grounds that Bellfield did not represent suppression of favorable exculpa-
tory evidence known to the Commonwealth. It was felt that fundamental
fairness principles should be also applicable to the government's case by
discouraging fishing expeditions by defense counsel and by maintaining
the confidence between the citizenry and prosecuting officers.96
Recently, the Virginia Supreme Court had the opportunity to interpret
Agurs in the case of Dozier v. Commonwealth."1 Petitioner was convicted
of the rape and abduction of a runaway, but the girl's original statement
response to Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957) which had allowed pretrial discov-
ery of statements. See generally 50 VA. L. Rav. 535 (1964). Federal criminal discovery is
now governed by Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, permitting some pre-
trial discovery. FED. R. CR. PRo. 16 is codified at Title 18, Appendix of the United States
Code.
95. VA. Sup. CT. R. 3A:14(b). The rule states:
(b) Discovery by the Accused.
(1) Upon written motion of an accused a court shall order the Commonwealth's
attorney to permit the accused to inspect and copy or photograph any relevant (i)
written or recorded statements or confessions made by the accused, or copies thereof,
that are known by the Commonwealth's attorney to be within the possession, custody
or control of the Commonwealth, and (ii) written reports of autopsies, ballistic tests,
fingerprint analyses, handwriting analyses, blood, urine and breath tests, other scien-
tific reports, and written reports of a physical or mental examination of the accused
or the alleged victim made in connection with the particular case, or copies thereof,
that are known by the Commonwealth's attorney to be within the possession, custody
or control of the Commonwealth.
(2) Upon written motion of an accused a court shall order the Commonwealth's
attorney to permit the accused to inspect and copy or photograph designated books,
papers, documents, tangible objects, buildings or places, or copies or portions thereof,
that are within the possession, custody, or control of the Commonwealth, upon a
showing that the items sought may be material to the preparation of his defense and
that the request is reasonable. This subparagraph does not authorize the discovery
or inspection of statements made by Commonwealth witnesses or prospective Com-
monwealth witnesses to agents of the Commonwealth or of reports, memoranda or
other internal Commonwealth documents made by agents in connection with the in-
vestigation or prosecution of the case, except as provided in clause (ii) of subpara-
graph (b)(1) of this rule.
(Emphasis added).
96. Bellfield v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. at 307, 208 S.E.2d at 774. See Lowe v. Common-
wealth, 218 Va. 670, 239 S.E.2d 112 (1977) (holding that the Commonwealth need not sup-
ply the names and addresses of witnesses). Among other policy reasons given for the
Bellfield holding by the Virginia Supreme Court was the protection of victims of the crime
and public-spirited citizens offering testimony. Cf. Louisell, supra note 22, at 100 (discredit-
ing the intimidation factor).
97. 219 Va. 1113, 253 S.E.2d 655 (1979).
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to police did not mention rape and was fuzzy as to the details of the
abduction. During trial, the defense specifically requested the statement
but was never given a copy. The court reversed and remanded holding
that the "exculpatory value" of the extra-judicial statement was "its util-
ity for discrediting her as a witness."0 8 The court placed Dozier within
the second Agurs category and interpreted Agurs as requiring three stan-
dards of constitutional materiality, thereby indicating how it might deal
with future suppression of evidence cases. 9
V. Brady AND THE POLICE INVESTIGATION
The last few years have seen a burst of legal discussion propounding a
constitutional right to present a defense. 100 Ancillary to this would be the
right to an adequate police investigation or, at least, the right of the de-
fense to have access to police reports and investigative aids.101 Either
right can be grounded in both the sixth amendment right to counsel 0 2
and the fifth amendment due process requirement as considered in
Brady.10 8 However, fundamental to the reasoning that Brady mandates
an adequate or accessible investigation is the theory behind the Brady
lineage: inequality in resources hampers the defense in trial prepara-
tion.10 It is problematic whether the Supreme Court would accept this
theory at this time;10 5 so any expansion of Brady rights must be ad-
98. Id. at 1118, 253 S.E.2d at 658. The court seems to have distinguished Belifield with-
out mentioning it because the witness's pretrial statements were found to be exculpatory
despite their use for impeachment purposes. The court also seems to reject the Garrison v.
Maggio rationale of a higher standard of materiality for impeachment evidence. See notes
82-84 supra and accompanying text.
99. In discussing the materiality standards, the court said: "From a defendant's view-
point, the least onerous is the 'might have affected' standard in the Brady situation, fol-
lowed progressively by the 'reasonable likelihood' standard in the Mooney situation and the'reasonable doubt' standard in the Agurs situation." 219 Va. at 1116-17, 253 S.E.2d at 657.
The court refused to concern itself with the reasonable doubt standard although mentioning
the dissent in Agurs as questioning its viability.
100. Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An Emergent Constitutional Guarantee in
Criminal Trials, 9 INn. L. REv. 713 (1976); Comment, The Indigent's Right to an Adequate
Defense: Expert and Investigational Assistance in Criminal Proceedings, 55 CORNELL L.
REv. 632 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Comment, The Indigent's Right].
101. See United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Note, Toward a Con-
stitutional Right, supra note 20; Note, The Constitutional Mandate of Effective Assistance
of Counsel: The Duty to Investigate, 6 HoFSmA L. REV. 245 (1977).
102. See Nakell, supra note 4, at 462-69; Note, Toward a Constitutional Right, supra
note 20, at 843-47.
103. See Nakell, supra note 4, at 451-62; Note, Toward a Constitutional Right, supra
note 20, at 848-50.
104. See Brennan, supra note 29.
105. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112 n.20.
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dressed within the framework of Agurs: that a specific request for a par-
ticular avenue of investigation is necessary rather than a general request
which would fall within the third Agurs situation and probably fail to
meet materiality standardsl1e
An underlying assumption to extending Brady to police investigations
is that police action is synonomous with the prosecutorial function. 10 7
However, the crucial leap is in accepting the failure to investigate as
amounting to the suppression of evidence, whether the failure is negligent
or willful. 1°0 A case which made the crucial leap and presented facts clari-
fying such an extension of Brady was Bowen v. Eyman.10 9 Petitioner, an
indigent, was convicted of rape and robbery. Prior to trial, he moved for a
court-appointed expert to compare seminal fluid taken from the victim to
his own blood in order to effect a typing and, if the two did not match, to
negate his guilt.1 0 The district court held that "fundamental fairness"
required such an expert as a matter of constitutional right and the stae's"refusal to run the test is tantamount to a suppression of evidence such
as there was in Brady v. Maryland ....
Five months earlier, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, by implica-
tion, also raised the possibility of due process deprivation as a result of
inadequate police investigation. In Peoples v. Hocker,1 1 2 the petitioner
was convicted of murder but contended that the victim committed sui-
cide. He argued that if the police had conducted fingerprint, paraffin and
ballistics tests, he would have been exculpated. Nothing on the record
indicated whether the tests were or were not conducted, but the court felt
106. See notes 76-77 supra and accompanying text.
107. See Freeman v. Georgia, 599 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding a police detective's
knowing concealment of a witness amounted to state suppression). "We feel that when an
investigating police officer willfully and intentionally conceals material information, regard-
less of his motivation and the otherwise proper conduct of the state attorney, the police-
man's conduct must be imputed to the state as part of the prosecution team." Id. at 69. See
also Barbee v. Warden, 331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964); Evans v. Kropp, 254 F. Supp. 218
(E.D. Mich. 1966). Contra, Bowles v. Texas, 366 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1966); People v. Blank-
enship, 171 Cal. App. 2d 66, 340 P.2d 282 (1959).
108. See Note, Toward a Constitutional Right, supra note 20, at 856-59, dealing with
cases of lost evidence and lost informants which are closely analogous to the failure to inves-
tigate situation. For a discussion of lost evidence cases, see generally United States v. Bry-
ant, 439 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971); for a discussion of lost informants cases, see generally
Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
109. 324 F. Supp. 339 (D. Ariz. 1970).
110. As to identifying blood type of sperm, see A. MOENSSENS & F. INBAU, ScmNTIFIC
EVIDENCE IN CmMNAL CASES § 6.14 (2d ed. 1978).
111. Bowen v. Eyman, 324 F. Supp. at 340.
112. 423 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1970).
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"better investigation would have been helpful to the jury."11 The court
declined to establish criteria as to when "a certain quantum of police in-
vestigation constitutes due process" and concluded "the investigation was
not so poor as to amount to a deprivation of due process, much less a
suppression of evidence .... "114 The implication was that a poor investi-
gation might be violative of due process.
The District Court of Northern California seized on this language in
Adams v. Stone. 15 Petitioner alleged that when he was booked for first
degree murder he requested and was denied a blood or sobriety test and
that the administering of such tests was standard procedure. The court
felt that "[tihe line between intentional suppression of evidence or the
failure to preserve evidence and the intentional failure to make standard
tests would not seem to be a substantial one.""' The tests might have
established intoxication leading to a diminished capacity defense and re-
ducing the murder conviction to voluntary manslaughter. Declining to re-
view police procedure, the court issued an order to show cause why a
habeas writ should not be granted.111
The recent case of Lewinski v. Ristaino"8 dismissed an inadequate in-
vestigation argument by distinguishing Adams and Bowen. Petitioner was
convicted of the murder of a woman after sexual intercourse in his
friend's apartment. The day after his arrest, upon counsel's request, the
medical examiner extracted a test sample of sperm from the victim but,
due to its mixture with embalming fluid, a blood type was impossible.
The District Court of Massachusetts found no negligence on the part of
the police and believed the typing of the sperm would not have been dis-
positive of guilt."1 9 The court held:
Assuming arguendo that the police investigation was negligent, there is no
authority to indicate that police negligence in investigation, without more,
113. Id. at 964.
114. Id.
115. 378 F. Supp. 315, 317 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
116. Id. at 317.
117. Id.
118. 448 F. Supp. 690 (D. Mass. 1978).
119. Id. at 696 n.11. The typing of the sperm with petitioner's own blood would have
established: (1) he did not have intercourse with the victim, if no match or (2) the victim
had intercourse with petitioner or someone having the same blood type, if there was a
match. These results would either impeach or corroborate Smith's testimony that the two
had had sexual relations before the homicide. The court felt that, given the weight of the
rest of the evidence, Smith's testimony was inconsequential. But see Bowen v. Eyman, 324
F. Supp. 339 (D. Ariz. 1970), where the typing test would have gone to the heart of the rape
indictment.
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is equivalent to a denial of due process. . . . The cases on which petitioner
relies [Adams and Bowen] have two elements not present here. First, the
police or prosecution [in this case] did not refuse to conduct the tests upon
timely request or motion of the petitioner. Second, no evidence was
presented that standard police procedures were violated.1 20
Having considered these cases, three standards can be drawn in order
to establish a Brady argument for inadequate investigation being tanta-
mount to suppression in two different fact situations. In situation one,
police conduct can be classified as willful suppression of evidence by re-
fusal to investigate; situation two would involve negligent investigation.
The three standards are as follows: (1) the duty-situation one where the
accused or his counsel specifically requests a test to be run;121 situation
two where, in absence of a request, standard police procedure of con-
ducting such tests under the circumstances is not followed; 122 (2) the
breach-situation one where, after a request, there is a refusal to run the
test; 2 3 situation two where standard procedure is not followed; 24 (3) ma-
teriality requirement-situation one where, if a specific request is made,
the test must be material as to guilt 25 or punishment;1 26 situation two
where no materiality is required if the test is standard procedure. 2 7
At this point, it must be noted that inadequate investigation, by neces-
sity, deals with police conduct in areas of scientific testing; 28 other inves-
tigation not pursued by the police, such as interviewing of witnesses,
might not be viewed as being suppression of evidence. The reason for this
centers on the previously cited argument that there is a need for diligence
on the part of defense counsel. 2 9 It is obvious that in a situation of negli-
gent or wilful refusal to investigate, even the most diligent defense coun-
120. 448 F. Supp. at 696-97.
121. Adams v. Stone, 378 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Bowen v. Eyman, 324 F. Supp.
339 (D. Ariz. 1970).
122. Peoples v. Hocker, 423 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1970); Lewinski v. Ristaino, 448 F. Supp.
690 (D. Mass. 1978); Adams v. Stone, 378 F. Supp. 315 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
123. 378 F. Supp. 315; 324 F. Supp. 339.
124. 378 F. Supp. 315.
125. 324 F. Supp. 339.
126. 378 F. Supp. 315.
127. Id.
128. The above four cases, Adams, Bowen, Lewinski, and Hocker, specifically dealt with
scientific evidence in the form of sperm tests, sobriety tests, ballastics tests, paraffin tests
and fingerprint identification. See generally MOENSSENS & INBAU, supra note 110.
129. But see United States v. Hibler, 463 F.2d 455 (9th Cir. 1972); Jackson v. Wainwright,
390 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1968); Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir. 1966); United
States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.2d 763 (3d Cir. 1955), all holding no need for
diligence.
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sel would not have access to physical evidence in police custody or labora-
tory resources to conduct tests, whereas counsel could gather and
interview witnesses. The original Brady rationale of inequality of re-
sources becomes crucial from a due process standpoint, especially with
regard to the indigent defendant.13 0 How can a fair trial be possible for
one who does not have the ability to garner independent scientific analy-
sis of potentially damning evidence? An onus must be placed on the po-
lice or other investigatory bodies to conduct such tests in their capacity as
public officers in order to arrive at true and just criminal proceedings,
perhaps as an inherent duty s but, at least, as a duty upon request.
VI. ACCESS TO STATE CRIME LABORATORIES
More than passing notice must logically be given to access to state
crime laboratory facilities since it has been argued that scientific testing
will be the major area of controversy in adequate investigation cases. Vir-
ginia Code section 2.1-426 transfers the Division of Consolidated Labora-
tory Services to the Department of General Service. s13 Further, section
2.1-429.1 establishes a Bureau of Forensic Science within the Division to
provide forensic laboratory services upon request to state police, the
Commonwealth's Attorney, local chief of police or sheriff, local fire de-
130. See Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1974) holding:
The principles steadfastly announced in the Supreme Court decisions reviewed above
require us to hold that the effective assistance of counsel guarantee of the Due Pro-
cess Clause requires, when necessary, the allowance of investigative expenses or ap-
pointment of investigative assistance for indigent defendants in order to insure effec-
tive preparation of their defense by their attorneys.
Id. at 1351 (citations omitted). But cf. Mason v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 1091, 254 S.E.2d
116 (1979) (holding no requirement that the state provide funds for an independent psychi-
atric examination of the accused). See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3006(A)(e) (1976) (funding
investigative assistance to indigents in federal prosecutions); Comment, The Indigent's
Right, supra note 100, at 635.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals would extend this investigation to all criminal defen-
dants. In Barnard v. Henderson, 514 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1975), the court allowed pretrial
examination of the murder weapon following a defense request and held:
The question is not one of discovery but rather the defendant's right to the means
necessary to conduct his defense.... Fundamental fairness is violated when a crimi-
nal defendant on trial for his liberty is denied the opportunity to have an expert of
his choosing, bound by appropriate safeguards imposed by the Court, examine a piece
of critical evidence whose nature is subject to varying expert opinion.
Id. at 746. Recently the Fifth Circuit has emphasized that the evidence must be both "criti-
cal" and "subject to varying expert opinion" for due process to mandate an independent
investigation. Gray v. Rowley, 604 F.2d 382, 383 (5th Cir. 1979) (no need to inspect clothes
of rape victim in light of other overwhelming evidence).
131. Note, Toward a Constitutional Right, supra note 20, at 868-71.
132. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-426 (Repl. Vol. 1979).
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partment, any state agency in a criminal matter, and any federal investi-
gatory agency. 83
The Virginia Code in section 2.1-433 also makes provision for the ac-
cused person or his attorney to have the results of a scientific investiga-
tion.134 This section also allows the person accused or his attorney to re-
quest in the court in which charges are pending a scientific investigation
to be conducted by the Division as long as he believes, in good faith, such
investigation is relevant. The motion is heard ex parte, and the prosecu-
tion may request the results of the investigation for the Commonwealth's
inspection.
This progressive statute creates a prophylactic remedy to inadequate
police investigation as to scientific evidence;3s it is both a rule of discov-
ery and of further investigation. The question may be raised whether fail-
ure to avail oneself of the benefits of the statute constitutes a defendant's
waiver of a defense of negligent police investigation in future proceedings.
However, standing alone, the statute joins the doctrine of open files and
in camera inspections as leading solutions to the criminal discovery
problem.138
133. Id. at § 2.1-429.1.
134. Id. at § 2.1-433 which reads as follows:
Rights of accused person or his attorney to results of investigation or to
investigation.-Upon the request of any person accused of a crime, or upon the
request of such accused person's attorney, the Division shall furnish to such accused
or his attorney the results of any investigation which has been conducted by it and
which is related in any way to a crime for which such person is accused. In any case
in which an attorney of record for a person accused of violation of any criminal law of
the Commonwealth, or such person, may desire such scientific investigation, he shall,
by motion filed before the court in which said charge is pending, certify that in good
faith he believes that such scientific investigation may be relevant to such criminal
charge. The motion shall be heard ex parte as soon as practicable and such court
shall, after hearing upon such motion and being satisfied as to the correctness of such
certification, order that the same be performed by the Division of Consolidated Labo-
ratory Services and shall prescribe in its order the method of custody, transfer, and
return of evidence submitted for scientific investigation. Upon the request of the
Commonwealth's attorney of the jurisdiction in which the charge is pending, he shall
be furnished the results of such scientific investigation.
135. Cf. Note, Toward a Constitutional Right, supra note 20 (which argues that dismissal
of charges is an appropriate post-conviction remedy for inadequate investigation).
136. In the open file doctrine, the defense would have complete access to the prosecutor's
files, thereby unburdening both courts and lawyers in lengthy pretrial discovery. The ine-
quality of resources argument would be defused while the policy that the prosecutor is
bound to arrive at the truth would be served. The doctrine of in camera inspection allows
the court to view potentially exculpatory evidence, after a motion to decide if it is material,
without harm to the prosecution if it is not. See generally, Comment, Brady v. Maryland
and the Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose, 40 U. Cm. L. Rav. 112 (1972); Note, Implementing
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Some problem arises in section 2.1-434 which prohibits the use of Divi-
sion laboratory facilities by independent experts employed by the defense
in order to examine materials previously tested by the Division.137 Such a
prohibition appears to be a serious encroachment on the opportunity to
present rebuttal testimony to Division findings and draws into question
whether the state crime laboratories are to be pro-law enforcement in
their orientation or neutral in their undertakings. The statute also is con-
trary to the Brady spirit of equalizing resources between the defendant
and the prosecution, especially considering the fact that the crime lab is
probably the best equipped facility in the state.138
VII. CONCLUSION
Brady held that the prosecution's suppression of any evidence which
was material to the guilt or punishment of the defendant was, after a
request for such evidence, a violation of due process. In Bowen, Brady
was extended so that a refusal to run tests requested by the accused was
tantamount to a suppression of evidence. The Brady rationale that a fair
trial is impossible due to the inequality of resources between the govern-
ment and the defense3 9 may lead to further judicial extension by way of
holding negligent investigation or willful refusal to investigate as being
suppression of evidence. In the alternative, statutory enlargement of in-
Brady v. Maryland: An Argument for a Pretrial Open File Policy, 43 U. CIN. L. REV. 889
(1974).
137. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-434 (Repl. Vol. 1979) states:
Reexamination by independent experts.-Independent experts employed by
an attorney of record for a person accused of violation of any criminal law of the
Commonwealth, or such person, for the purpose of reexamination of materials previ-
ously examined in any laboratory of the Division of Consolidated Laboratory Services
shall conduct their analysis or examinations independent of the facilities, equipment
or supplies of the Division.
138. As for other state crime laboratory statutes, cf. CAL. [PENAL] CODE § 11050.5(b)
(West Supp. 1980) (use restricted to indigents only for purposes of conducting tests); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 165.79 (West Supp. 1980-81) (test results from state crime laboratories are
privileged).
In cases of controlled substances, state crime laboratories may adopt reasonable regula-
tions policing the substances that refuse independent analysis without depriving due process
rights to an accused. See United States v. Williams, 613 F.2d 560 (5th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Gaultney, 606 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1979).
139. Fahringer, Has Anyone Here Seen Brady?.: Discovery in Criminal Cases, 9 CIuM. L.
BULL. 325 (1973) holding:
It is the disparity between the investigatory facilities which harms the defendant.
Consequently, the real damage is done before trial or in the early stages of the litiga-
tion, and it is to that time period, rather than the highly speculative impact on the
jury, that the court's attention should be addressed.
Id. at 332.
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vestigative opportunities can also be useful in raising criminal discovery
to the highly-refined level of civil discovery, particularly by opening state
crime labs to defendants and, thereby, facilitating scientific investigation
and removing the traditional disadvantage placed on the defendant.
Walter H. Ohar

